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Abstract. Following both theoretical and practical arguments, we con-
struct UC-secure bit-commitment protocols that place their strength on
the sender’s side and are built using tamper-evident devices, e.g., a type
of distinguishable, sealed envelopes. We show that by using a second
formalisation of tamper-evident distinguishable envelopes we can attain
better security guarantees, i.e., EUC-security. We show the relations be-
tween several ﬂavours of weak bit-commitments, bit-commitments and
distinguishable tamper-evident envelopes. We focus, at all points, on the
lightweight nature of the underlying mechanisms and on the end-to-end
human veriﬁability.
1 Introduction
Most of the recent approaches to primitive-construction employ the universal
composability (UC) framework [6] in order to specify and prove the correct-
ness/security of their cryptographic designs. The UC framework is a formalism
that allows for cryptographic protocols to be computationally analysed in a single
session, yet the security guarantees thereby obtained are preserved when mul-
tiple sessions are composed concurrently, in parallel and/or sequentially. In [6],
Canetti shows that any polynomial-time multi-party functionality is feasible in
the UC framework if the majority of participants are honest. Otherwise, feasi-
bility is usually attained if the models are augmented with “setup-assumptions”,
obtaining the so-called “UC hybrid models” (i.e., extra ideal functionalities are
made available to the parties).
UC-formalisations of tamper-evident/tamper-resistant hardware devices have
been used as setups to UC-realize diﬀerent cryptographic primitives, from bit-
commitment to polling schemes [13,15,12,16,17,19,18]; the tamper-evidence of
a device implies that, if tampered with, the device will signal the inﬂicted ab-
normalities, whereas tamper-resistance denotes the impossibility of tampering
with the device. Tamper-evidence-based UC-secure protocols [16,17,19] also bear
lightweight, humanly constructible/veriﬁable cryptographic mechanisms. To re-
alize UC-secure weak bit-commitment (WBC) protocols, a type of distinguish-
able tamper-evident envelopes were shown suﬃcient and necessary (in the sense
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that simpler functionalities of distinguishable tamper-evident containers are not
suﬃcient to realize bit-commitments) [18]. The protocols thereby constructed
placed their “strength” on the receiver’s side, i.e., it is the receiver who creates
the tamper-evident devices or prepares them. In [18], Moran and Naor raise the
question of ﬁnding such lightweight, UC-secure (weak) bit-commitment protocols
that in turn place their strength on the sender’s side, i.e, sender-strong proto-
cols. Along similar lines, Brassard, Chaum and Cre´peau in foundation papers
have long made the question: “Is it preferable to trust Vic or Peggy? We do not
know, but it sure is nice to have the choice. [4]”.
Contributions. The contributions of this paper are as follows:
– We create weak bit-commitments that place the (adversarial) strength on
the committer side, i.e., sender-strong WBC, and that are UC-secure. To
achieve this, we require a new formalisation of distinguishable envelopes and
use it as a UC setup functionality (see the motivations below).
– We describe a hierarchy of ideal functionalities for sender-strong weak bit-
commitments and UC-realize them. In this, we relate better with the existing
literature in the ﬁeld (see Section 2.2 for details).
– We relate our ﬁrst functionality of distinguishable envelopes (FDEOneSeal), the
standard UC-functionality of bit-commitment (FBC) and those of WBC
(already existing and newly introduced herein), showing most implication-
relations between them.
– We introduce a second distinguishable envelope functionality (FpurpotedDEOneSeal ),
which allows for the corresponding DE-based WBC protocols herein and the
ones in [18] to be enjoyed a stronger security notion: be not only UC-secure,
but also EUC-secure.
Motivation for Our Formalisation of Tamper-Evident Envelopes. As Moran et
al. state in [18], there are many ways to formalise tamper-evident containers,
reﬂecting the diﬀerent requirements of the possible physical implementations of
such devices. The sole motivation given in [18] for allowing creator-forgeability
is the desiderata of creating more complex, somewhat stronger protocols. But,
when it comes to placing this sort of asymmetric strength on the sender’s side,
it only makes sense to construct commitment protocols that are, in the stan-
dard sense, computationally hiding and somewhat binding, i.e., the receiver is
powerless and the sender can possibly equivocate his commitments. (By con-
trast, in [18] are both partially hiding and partially binding and are then am-
pliﬁed.) In this context, we conjecture that it is not possible to be based only
on tamper-evident envelopes a` la Moran et al. [18] and construct hiding sender-
strong bit-commitment protocols, which would further be UC-secure in the same
time. To overcome this shortcoming, we have herein slightly modiﬁed the origi-
nal, tamper-evident envelope functionality from [18], preventing the creator from
resealing envelopes. Hence, we model seal-once distinguishable tamper-evident
envelopes (or, envelope allowing one-seal only). By contrast, the functionality
in [18] formalises a multi-seal distinguishable tamper-evident envelope.
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Furthermore, the previous protocols designed using tamper-evident envelopes
a` la Moran et al. [18] were only UC-secure and not EUC-secure. We noted that
if we relaxed the forging abilities of the envelope-creator in the aforementioned
way and we furthermore allow for purported destinator for envelopes the corre-
sponding DE-based protocols obtained both here and in [18] attain EUC-security
and not only UC-security.
Our Weak Bit-Commitments from a theoretical viewpoint. Alongside the UC-
framework, sender-strong weak bit-commitments are also interesting by tradi-
tional theoretical lines, where they are easier to construct (see Section 3.4).
In [4], outside of the UC-framework, Brassard et al. proved that the existence
of “chameleon” bit-commitments1 implies the existence of zero-knowledge (ZK)
proofs of knowledge which were MA-protocols (i.e., where the veriﬁer sends in-
dependent bits). Moreover, in [2] Beaver proved that in order for the aforemen-
tioned ZK proofs of knowledge (PoK) to be provable secure against adaptive
adversaries, the chameleon bit-commitments (BC) are not enough, but content-
equivocable bit commitments are needed (i.e., the equivocation is possible only
if a record of the traﬃc between the sender and the receiver is available to the
sender and not other types of witnesses, like parts of messages). One of our
weak BC functionalities, Fq−WBCLearnAtOpening, models this last type of important weak
bit-commitments.
Our Weak Sender-Strong Bit-Commitments from a practical viewpoint. A real-
life situation were the committer/sender should be given the chance to “change
his mind” is the case in negotiation-based protocols where the receiver is known
or thought to be corrupt (e.g, hostage-release cases, reputations [1], anonymous
special auctioning [21], etc.).
To sum up, we are motivated to present certain means of attaining diﬀerent
UC and EUC-secure, bit-commitment protocols placing their strength on the
sender’s side, i.e., sender-strong (SS).
Related Work. A series of works on designing UC-secure protocols using tamper-
resistant building blocks have recently emerged [13,8,15,12,19]. For example, the
formalism by Katz, in [13], opens for the creation and exchange of tamper-proof
hardware tokens used in a commitment protocol, which is UC-secure if the tokens
are stateful and the DDH assumption holds. In [8], the two-party computation
can equally be UC-realized, but the model is relaxed: the tokens are stateless
and the assumption is switched to the existence of oblivious transfer protocols in
the UC plain model. Similar results are obtained using tamper-resistant devices
as building blocks in a model called the trusted agent model [15]. Like in [8]
and unlike in [13], Mateus and Vaudenay [15] permit a freer ﬂow of devices from
their creator to their users and backwards. Similar protocols are constructed by
Moran et al., in [19], using tamper-resistant hardware tokens that can be passed
1 These are commitments where the sender could cheat at the decommitment phase
if given extra information.
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in one direction only. We note that the distinction of having UC-commitments
which place the strength on the sender or, on the contrary, place their strength
on the receiver has also been underlined [19] within this context of using tamper-
resistant hardware as UC-setup.
Simpler cryptographic protocols UC-constructed using not tamper-resistant
devices, but tamper-evident devices in form of sealed envelopes and sealed locks
have been studied in [18,16,17]. All the protocols thereby presented place their
strength on the receiver’s side.
2 Setup and Target UC Functionalities
2.1 UC-Setup Functionalities Modelling Tamper-Evident Envelopes
The FDEOneSeal Functionality. In general, a functionality for tamper-evidence
stores a table of envelopes, indexed by their unique id. More precisely, an entry
in this table is of the form (id, value, holder, state). The values in one entry
indexed by id are respectively denoted valueid, holderid and stateid.
In particular, the functionality FDEOneSeal models a tamper-evident “envelope”,
distinguishable by some obvious mark (e.g., barcode, serial number, colour, etc.).
Protocol parties can simply open such containers, but any such opening will
be obvious to other parties who receive the “torn” envelope. The FDEOneSeal ideal
functionality, running in the presence of parties P1, . . . , Pn and an ideal adversary
I is described in the following.
Seal(id , value). Let this command be received from party Pi. It creates and seals
an envelope. If this is the ﬁrst Seal message with id id, the functionality stores
the tuple (id, value, Pi, sealed) in the table. If this is not the ﬁrst command of
type Seal for envelope id, then the functionality halts.
Send(id , Pj ). Let this command be received from party Pi. This command en-
codes the sending of an envelope held by Pi to a party Pj . Upon receiving
this command from party Pi, the functionality veriﬁes that there is an entry
in its table which is indexed by id and has holderid = Pi. If so, it outputs
(Receipt, id, Pi, Pj) to Pj and I and replaces the entry in the table with
(id, valueid, Pj , stateid).
Open id . Let this command be received from party Pi. This command encodes
an envelope being opened by the party that currently holds it. Upon receiving
this command, the functionality veriﬁes that an entry for container id appears in
the table and that holderid = Pi. If so, it sends (Opened, id, valueid) to Pi and
I. It also replaces the entry in the table with (id, valueid, holderid, broken).
Verify id . Let this command be received from party Pi. This command denotes
Pi’s veriﬁcation of whether or not the seal on an envelope has been broken. The
functionality veriﬁes that an entry indexed by id appears in the table and that
holderid = Pi. It sends (Verified, id, stateid) to Pi and to I.
One of the diﬀerences from the corresponding functionality presented in [18]
is that the one introduced above does not output tuples containing the creator’s
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identity. This would have been of no interest for the protocols constructed in the
following and would hinder EUC-security proofs given herein. However, a more
important diﬀerence is that the creator of an envelope cannot re-seal it, i.e., he
cannot forge the value stored initially inside the envelope. Hence, we use the
syntagm “OneSeal” to refer to the functionality herein and, sometimes, we use
the expression “MultiSeal” to designate the tamper-evident envelopes in [18].
This modiﬁcation is driven by the fact that we could not yet prove or disprove
the existence of a sender-strong, somewhat binding and not partially hiding, but
computationally hiding bit commitment that is also simulatable within UC, using
only creator-forgeable/multi-seal tamper-evident envelopes.
It is relatively easy to see that regular bit-commitments can be immediately
constructed using one distinguishable tamper-evident envelope, see Section 4.
The relation with the regular commitment functionality is however not symmet-
ric, as will detail (i.e., if FDEOneSeal implies BC, it is not necessarily the case that
FBCOneSeal implies DE).
The tamper-evident envelope functionality in [18] is denoted as FDEMultiSeal.
2.2 Target UC Functionalities of Bit-Commitment
We now describe our target functionalities Fq−WBC that model diﬀerent weak
bit-commitment (WBC) protocols, where
 ∈ {EscapeThenMayCheat, LearnAtCommitment, LearnAtOpening}.
In this fashion, we can relate the WBCs UC-realized herein both with traditional
weak bit-commitments [2] of theoretical importance (e.g., see our Fq−WBCLearnAtOpening),
and with weak bit-commitments UC-created in [18] with distinguishable en-
velopes (see our Fq−WBCEscapeThenMayCheat). The diﬀerences between these functionalities
lie mainly in learning that equivocation is possible (yet not obligatory) at the
commitment phase (Fq−WBCLearnAtCommitment) or the opening phase (Fq−WBCLearnAtOpening) vs.
cheating only when the committer has not yet been caught abusing the protocol
(Fq−WBCEscapeThenMayCheat).
The Fq−WBCEscapeThenMayCheat functionality idealising q-weak bit-commitment. Let q ∈
(0, 1). The functionality maintains a variable bit, where bit ranges over {0, 1,}.
Commit b. When the Commit b command (b ∈ {0, 1}) is sent to the function-
ality by a sender S, the value b is recorded in the variable bit. The functionality
of Fq−WBCEscapeThenMayCheat outputs Committed to the receiver R and to the ideal ad-
versary I2. Further commands of this type or of type EquivocatoryCommit
below are ignored by the functionality.
EquivocatoryCommit. When the EquivocatoryCommit command is sent
to the functionality, the Fq−WBCEscapeThenMayCheat functionality replies to the sender and
2 Throughout, the fact that the output is sent to the ideal adversary as well is inherent
to the UC framework, i.e., see the UC-notion of “delayed output”.
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the ideal adversary with a ⊥ message, with probability 1 − q. With probability
q, the functionality sets the variable bit to the value , outputs Committed to
the sender, the receiver and to the ideal adversary. Further commands of this
type or of type Commit above are ignored by the functionality.
AbortCommit. When the AbortCommit command is sent to the function-
ality, the Fq−WBCEscapeThenMayCheat functionality replies to the sender, to the receiver,
and to the ideal adversary with a ⊥ message (denoting an abnormal end of the
execution). Further commands are ignored.
Open. Upon receiving the command Open from the sender, the functionality
veriﬁes that the sender has already sent the Commit b command. Then, the
Fq−WBCEscapeThenMayCheat functionality outputs (Opened, bit) to the receiver and to the
ideal adversary. Further commands are ignored by the functionality.
EquivocatoryOpen c. Upon receiving this command from the sender, with
c ∈ {0, 1}, the functionality veriﬁes that bit = . Then, the functionality
Fq−WBCEscapeThenMayCheat outputs (Opened, c) to the receiver and to the ideal adver-
sary. Further commands are ignored by the functionality.
In this functionality, the binding property of commitments can be deﬁed.
It corresponds to the weak bit-commitment functionality used by Moran and
Naor [18], but it applies to the sender-strong case. In that sense, a dishonest
player decides to try and open his commitment to any value even from the very
beginning of the protocol and he can be successful in doing so with a probability
of q ∈ (0, 1), once he has not been caught red-handed.
Note that the WBC functionality presented above and the ones to be pre-
sented further model single bit commitments. Yet, they can easily be extended
to respective functionalities for multiple commitments: i.e., eachCommit b com-
mand sent by a sender S aimed at a receiver R would become Commit(id , b,R)
and each corresponding functionality would, for each commitment, store a tuple
(id, sender, receiver, value) doing the respective checks.
The Fq−WBCLearnAtCommitment functionality idealising q-weak bit-commitment. Let q ∈
(0, 1). The functionality maintains a tuple (bit, equiv), where bit ranges over
{0, 1} and equiv ranges over {“Yes”, “No”}.
Commit b. When the Commit b command (b ∈ {0, 1}) is sent to the function-
ality, the value b is recorded in the variable bit. With probability q the value
“Yes” is stored in equiv or, with probability 1 − q the value “No” is stored in
equiv. The Fq−WBCLearnAtCommitment functionality outputs Committed to the receiver
and to the ideal adversary. The Fq−WBCLearnAtCommitment functionality outputs the up-
dated value of equiv to the sender and to the ideal adversary. Further commands
of this type are ignored by the functionality.
Open. Upon receiving this command, the functionality veriﬁes that the sender
has already sent the Commit b command. Then, the Fq−WBCLearnAtCommitment function-
ality outputs (Opened, bit) to the receiver and to the ideal adversary. Further
commands are ignored by the functionality.
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EquivocatoryOpen. Upon receiving this command, the functionality veriﬁes
that the sender has already sent the Commit b command. Then, the functional-
ity checks the value of equiv. If the value is “Yes”, then Fq−WBCLearnAtCommitment outputs
(Opened, bit) to the receiver and to the ideal adversary. If the value is “No”,
then Fq−WBCLearnAtCommitment halts. Further commands are ignored by the functionality.
The Fq−WBCLearnAtCommitment functionality mirrors a protocol which allows the sender
to cheat by breaking the binding property of the protocol. Note that this cheating
possibility is “decided” at the commitment phase, i.e., it is at some point during
the commitment phase that the potential cheater learns about his opportunity.
Also, note that while the cheating is allowed, it does not necessarily need to
happen (i.e., there are two distinct opening commands).
Next, we give a similar functionality where in turn the possibility of equivo-
cation becomes clear only at the opening phase.
The Fq−WBCLearnAtOpening functionality idealising q-weak bit-commitment. Let q ∈
(0, 1). The functionality maintains a variable bit, ranging over {0, 1}.
Commit. When the Commit b command (b ∈ {0, 1}) is sent to the function-
ality, the value b is recorded in the variable bit. The Fq−WBCLearnAtOpening functionality
outputs Committed to the receiver and to the ideal adversary. Further com-
mands of this type are ignored by the functionality.
Open. Upon receiving this command, the functionality veriﬁes that the sender
has already sent the Commit b command. Then, the Fq−WBCLearnAtOpening functional-
ity outputs (Opened, bit) to the receiver and to the ideal adversary. Further
commands are ignored by the functionality.
EquivocatoryOpen. Upon receiving this command, the functionality veriﬁes
that the sender has already sent the Commit b command. With probability
q, the Fq−WBCLearnAtOpening outputs (Opened, bit) to the receiver and to the ideal
adversary. With probability 1 − q, the Fq−WBCLearnAtOpening sends ⊥ to the sender S
and the ideal adversary I. Further commands of this type are ignored by the
functionality (but commands of type Open are still allowed).
The Fq−WBCLearnAtOpening functionality mirrors a protocol which allows the sender to
cheat by breaking the binding property of the protocol, knowingly at some point
during the opening phase, i.e., i.e., it is at some point during the opening phase
that the potential cheater learns about his opportunity, similarly to traditional
lines in [2]. As aforementioned, note that while the cheating is allowed, it does
not necessarily need to happen.
Note that sender-strong weak bit-commitments protocols with distinguish-
able, tamper-evident envelopes that allow only partial hiding are of course easier
to UC-construct than those that require perfect hiding. Ampliﬁcations
techniques could then be applied. However, we take the view that once the pro-
tocols that we seek are sender-strong, UC-realizing a functionality which is only
partially hiding is would contradict the aim for the senders’ strength (hence, the
“computationally hiding” UC functionalities that we have given above).
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3 UC (Sender-Strong) Bit-Commitments
Driven by the theoretical and practical motivations presented in the introduction,
we are now going to present protocols that UC-implement the weak
bit-commitment (WBC) functionalities above, use the herein introduced func-
tionalities of distinguishable envelopes as the UC-setup and place their strength
on the senders’ sides.
We start with the protocol Pass&MayCheat which UC-realizes the function-
ality F 12−WBCEscapeThenMayCheat using the FDEOneSeal. We continue the protocols CommitEn-
ablesCheat and OpenEnablesCheat which respectively UC-realize the
functionalities of F 23−WBCLearnAtCommitment and F
2
3−WBC
LearnAtOpening, using the FDEOneSeal. We
then present ampliﬁcation techniques of such weak BC protocols. The tech-
niques maintain the lightweight character of the constructions. We conclude the
section by a strengthening of the FDEOneSeal functionality such that we attain EUC-
security [7], i.e., not only UC-security.
3.1 The Pass&MayCheat Protocol
The Commitment Phase.
1. A sender S seals four envelopes and creates two pairs out of them such that
each pair contains the set {x, x} of values, for a random x ∈ {0, 1}. Each
pair “contains” its own value x. He sends two envelopes, one from each pair,
to the receiver R. (E.g., the pairs are pair1 = (E1, E2), pair2 = (E3, E4) and
S sends, e.g., E1, E3 to R).
2. The receiver R stores the identiﬁers of the envelopes in a register W . (I.e.,
it stores (1, 3), given the illustrated execution by S above.). Then, R sends
them back without opening them.
3. The sender S veriﬁes that the recently returned envelopes have the seals
unbroken. If this is not so, he halts. Otherwise, he sends the two envelopes
not sent before. (I.e., If seals are unbroken, then S sends the remaining
E2, E4.)
4. The receiver veriﬁes that the envelopes received do not have the ids stored
already. If they do, he halts. Otherwise, he opens one of these envelopes,
sends back the other one without opening it, together with the value of an
id stored already in W to request back one envelope. The receiver also stores
the ids of the envelopes seen this time round. (I.e., R opens, e.g., E2, sends
backE4 and, e.g., 1, thus requesting back envelopeE1.) Given the steps of the
protocol so far, note that the opened envelope together with the requested one
form an initial pair. Also, once the sender has sent this requested envelope,
the sender will be left with the other of the initial pairs at his end. These
comments equally apply to the equivocatorial commitment phase to follow.
5. The sender S veriﬁes that the recently returned envelope has the seal un-
broken. If this is not so, he halts. Otherwise, he sends the one requested
envelope to R. He also sends the value d = b ⊕ x, where b is the bit he is
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committing to and x is the bit hidden inside each envelope in the pair to be
found at his side. (I.e., If the seal is unbroken, then S sends the requested
E1, d = b⊕ x, where x is in E3 and/or in E4).
6. The receiver R opens the last envelope received and checks that the value
at its side are equal. If not, he aborts. (I.e., If E1 and E2 do not contain the
same value, then R aborts).
The EquivocatoryCommitment Phase.
1. A sender S seals four envelopes and creates two pairs out of them such
that one pair contains the set {x, x} of values, for a random x ∈ {0, 1}
and the other pair contains the values {0, 1}. He sends two envelopes, one
from each pair, to the receiver R. (E.g., The pairs are pair1 = (E1, E2),
pair2 = (E3, E4) and S sends E1, E3 to R).
2. Same as in the commitment phase.
3. Same as in the commitment phase.
4. Same as in the commitment phase.
5. Same as in the commitment phase.
6. Same as in the commitment phase.
Let A denote the pair of envelopes to be found at this stage on the sender side.
The Opening Phase.
1. The sender S sends one envelope Ek in the remaining pair, i.e., Ek ∈ A or
k ∈ {i, j}.
2. The receiver R checks that Ek is in the set A (by checking the ids). If so, he
opens the envelope Ek to ﬁnd the value bk hidden inside and then he sets
the commitment-bit b′ to d⊕ bk. Otherwise, the receiver halts.
The EquivocatoryOpening Phase.
1. The sender S sends from the remaining pair A the envelope Ek that contains
the bit d⊕ c, where c is the bit that the sender wants to open to.
2. Same as in the opening phase.
In the following ﬁgure, we give an illustration of the protocol above, in a
symmetric way (i.e., E1 and E2 could be interchanged in their appearances,
etc.).
Explanations on the Pass&MayCheat protocol. Assume ﬁrst that the sender S
creates pairs of envelopes such that each contains the set {x, x} of values and
that the sender respects the calculation of d for the non-equivocable case. It is
clear that at the end of the protocol, the sender has no choice but to open to
the correct bit. If, in turn, S does not form d as speciﬁed and R does follow the
protocol, then S may not be able to open.
Assume now that the sender S creates pairs of envelopes such that one contains
the set {x, x} of values and the other contains the set {0, 1} of values. Depending
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S R
seals env-pairs P1 = (E1, E2),
P2 = (E3, E4) s. t. the ordered
(x, x, 0, 1) or (x, x, y, y) is in
the pairs, with x, y ∈ {0, 1}
E1 from P1, E3 from P2
remember ids 1, 3, i.e., W = {1, 3}
{E1, E3}ﬀ
continue if {E1, E3}
have not been tampered
E2 from P1, E4 from P2
check ids 2, 4 /∈ {1, 3}, rmb. ids {2, 4}
open E2
(note that E2 and E1 to-be-requested form
the P1 pair)
E4, 1ﬀ
check E4 for tamper
(after sending E1 below,
S will be left with pair P2)
let d be b ⊕ bl ,
l ∈ {3, 4} E1, d check 1 ∈ {1, 3}, open E1
FOR Commit:
let d ∈ {0, 1}
E1, d check 1 ∈ {1, 3}, open E1
FOR EquivocatorialCommit:
FOR Open/EquivocatorialOpen:
let En, n ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} \ {k3, k1} En check if n ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} \ {k3, k1}
if passed, open En
set b′ to d ⊕ bn
if not passed, halt
on the choice of R to open envelopes, the sender may continue the protocol;
clearly this is possible in half of the cases (the possibility that a randomly chosen
bit x is equal either to 0 or to 1, depending which was the opening of R). In
such cases, S can clearly open the value d to any bit-value, since he is left with
x and its negation x in the pair A at his end.
Note that the receiver R cannot cheat without being caught: i.e., torn en-
velopes are obvious to the sender and opening by R of more than two envelopes
–to try and break the hiding property– is not possible due to the stage-by-stage
unsealing enforced by the protocol.
Also, note that the envelopes used within are seal-once envelopes. Thus, the
sender S is not able to change the values x stored inside the envelopes, after step
4 of the commitment phase (say, in order to avoid being caught by R).
Theorem 1. In a hybrid UC-model, where the setup is the FDEOneSeal functional-
ity, the Pass&MayCheat protocol UC-realizes the F 12−WBCEscapeThenMayCheat functionality.
Due to space constraints, the proof of Theorem 1 is given in the the full version
of this paper [3].
3.2 The CommitEnablesCheat and OpenEnablesCheat Protocols
The CommitEnablesCheat Protocol
The Commitment Phase. The sender wants to commit to a bit b and proceeds
as it follows.
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S R
pick b1, b2, b3, not all equal
seal bi in Ei, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}
E1, E2, E3
remember {E1, E2 E3}
ﬀE1, E2, E3check E1, E2, E3 for tamper
take m= MAJ(b1, b2, b3)
let d be b ⊕ m d
pick i in {1, 2, 3}ﬀ iFOR CommitEnablesCheat:dispose of Ei
pick i in {1, 2, 3}FOR OpenEnablesCheat:
dispose of Ei
honest S Ek with bk=m test: Ek is in {E1, E2 E3} \ {Ei}
if passed, open Ek
set b′ to d ⊕ bk
if not passed, halt
equivocatory S
Ek with bk=m test: Ek is in in {E1, E2 E3} \ {Ei}
if passed, open Ek
set b′ to d ⊕ bk
if not passed, halt
ﬀ i
1. The sender S creates 3 sealed envelopes denoted E1, E2, E3 respectively
containing the bits denoted b1, b2, b3, such that not all bits are equal. The
sender sends the envelopes over to the receiver R.
2. The receiver memorises the set {E1, E2, E3} of envelopes and sends them
back to the sender
3. The sender veriﬁes that the envelopes sent back are untampered with. Then,
he computes m as the majority of the bits sealed inside, i.e., he computes
m = MAJ(b1, b2, b3). The sender wants to commit to a bit b. He calculates
d = b⊕m. Then, the sender sends d to the receiver.
4. The receiver sends the identiﬁer i of an envelope that the sender should
dispose of, i.e., i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Let the set S = {E1, E2, E3} \ {Ei} denote the
set of remaining envelopes.
5. The sender disposes of envelope i. (Note that after this the sender can equiv-
ocate if the remaining envelopes contain diﬀerent bits.)
The equiv value is 23 .
The Opening Phase.
1. The non-equivoquing sender sends an envelope Ek such that bk = m.
The equivoquing sender sends an envelope Ek such that bk = m.
2. The receiver tests that Ek ∈ S and if so, he sets b′, the commitment bit, as
follows: b′ = d⊕ bk. If the test fails, the receiver halts.
Note that by being asked to discard3 an envelope at the opening phase instead of in
step 4 of the commitment phase, the idea behind protocol CommitEnablesCheat
can be shaped to obtain a protocol where the equivocation becomes clear only at
3 A possible way of implementing discarding is sending the emptied envelope back to
the receiver.
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the opening time. The protocol obtained in this way is hereby denoted
OpenEnablesCheat.The protocols CommitEnablesCheatand OpenEnablesCheat
are graphically represented in the previous ﬁgure.
Note once more that, unlike in the Pass&MayCheat protocol, in CommitEn-
ablesCheat and OpenEnablesCheat protocols, the committer can cheat with
some probability (i.e., 23 ), yet this is not inﬂuenced by him being caught cheat-
ing, but rather by a mere choice of the receiver.
These requirements sound similar to looking for a means in which Alice would
commit to a bit b using a BSC (binary symmetric channel) with noise level q [5].
Nevertheless, the existing solutions [5,10,20] to problems of the latter kind are
receiver-strong, not sender-strong. Also, they are not constructed to be UC-
secure, but secure by classical lines, which may be weaker. Moreover, those
original constructions involve error-correction codes and/or pseudo-random gen-
erators being manipulated by the participants. Thus, those primitives are also
beyond our cryptographically lightweight scope. Therefore, to obtain senders’
strength, UC-security, simplicity and human operability we have proposed pro-
tocols CommitEnablesCheat and OpenEnablesCheat above.
Explanations on the CommitEnablesCheat and OpenEnablesCheat protocols.
We detail on the CommitEnablesCheat protocol above, the explanations on Ope-
nEnablesCheat being very similar and immediately following. Let us consider
the case where the parties follow the protocol. We can see that if S prepares the
envelopes correctly (i.e., they contain a permutation of {x, x, x}, x ∈U {0, 1})
and he adheres to step 2, then at step 3, the value m = x. No matter what
value bi has (i.e., x or x), in the set S of remaining envelopes there is always an
envelope Ek with the value x inside that opens the commitment correctly. With
probability 23 , the set S still contains an envelope with value x. In this last case,
S could open his commitment to the ﬂipped bit (i.e., point 2 in the opening
phase). By the above, the protocol is complete. One can see that the case where
S does not follows the protocol in terms of envelope sealing does not bring him
any beneﬁt. In Theorem 2, we formalise the above explanations, in the context
of the UC framework.
Theorem 2. In a hybrid UC-model, where the setup is the FDEOneSeal functional-
ity, the CommitEnablesCheat and OpenEnablesCheat protocols UC-realize the




Due to space constraints, this proof is given in the full version of this paper [3].
3.3 Amplifying q-WBC Sender-Strong Protocols
Let ∈ {Pass&MayCheat, CommitEnablesCheat, OpenEnablesCheat}.
Let  ∈ {EscapeThenMayCheat, LearnAtCommitment, LearnAtOpening}.
By using k instances of a q-weak sender-strong protocol of the -kind of
protocols, we can obtain a protocol Amplified_ protocol that UC-realizes
Fqk−WBC . Hence, we can attain regular bit-commitments for a conveniently
large k. See the formalisations below.
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The Amplified_Pass&MayCheat Protocol:
(Equivocatory) Commitment Phase. The sender commits, all equivocally or
all normally, to a bit bj in k sequential rounds, each time using the
Fq−WBCEscapeThenMayCheat functionality, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}. The j-th such functionality is
denoted Fq−WBCEscapeThenMayCheat; j .
Each functionality Fq−WBCEscapeThenMayCheat; j to which EquivocatoryCommit was
sent, outputs to its sender Committed, with probability q and ⊥ otherwise. If ⊥
is sent, then the receiver aborts.
(Equivocatory) Opening Phase. The sender opens (equivocally or not) all
commitments using the functionalities of Fq−WBCEscapeThenMayCheat; j . The receiver halts
if the openings are not all the same.
Theorem 3. Let q ∈ (0, 1) and λ be a security parameter. By using k = Ω(λ)
instances of an Fq−WBC functionality, we can construct a protocol Amplified_
that UC-realizes the FBC functionality, where
 ∈ {EscapeThenMayCheat, LearnAtCommitment, LearnAtOpening} and
∈ {Pass&MayCheat, CommitEnablesCheat, OpenEnablesCheat}.
In particular, the protocol Amplified_Pass&MayCheat UC-realizes the func-
tionality of Fqk−WBCEscapeThenMayCheat.
For the regular BC functionality, FBC , see the full version of this paper [3].
The Amplified_Pass&MayCheat BC protocol is trivially following out of Am-
plified_Pass&MayCheat, i.e., where equivocation is not possible. By letting
k = log εlog q in Theorem 3, we make Amplified_Pass&MayCheat a ε-WBC, with
ε arbitrarily close to 0. However, for Amplified_Pass&MayCheat to UC-realize
FBC , we need a k to be of linear-size in the security parameter λ. Proofs that
weak bit-commitment protocols in the above sense can be ampliﬁed to regu-
lar bit-commitments exist already, e.g., [20]. The proofs therein follow long-
established lines, i.e., not the UC framework 4. Also, they often refer to receiver-
strong protocols and generally use more convoluted primitives, e.g., pseudo-
random generators, error-correcting codes, outside our lightweight interests. Our
proof is done in the UC framework and, as we can see, the protocol respects the
sender-strong aspects sought-after herein. Due to space constraints, the actual
proof of Theorem 3 is given in the full version of this paper [3].
3.4 (Stronger) Universally Composable Security
A UC-oriented note is that something as little as the order of the messages in the
commitment-phase of the weak protocol CommitEnablesCheat above and/or the
amount of randomness given to the sender does impact the UC-simulatability. A
protocol only diﬀerent from CommitEnablesCheat in that it inverts the order of
events 3 and 4 in the commitment phase does not UC-realize the F 23−WBCLearnAtCommitment
4 Similar proofs of ampliﬁcations may exist in the UC framework, however they would
not be with respect to the Fq−WBCi functionalities as introduced in Section 2.
Several Weak Bit-Commitments Using Seal-Once Tamper-Evident Devices 83
functionality, while it is perfectly hiding and binding with probability 23 in the
classical sense. Thus, it seems to be easier to construct q-weak bit-commitments
using just a formalisation of distinguishable envelopes, but when sender-strength
and UC-security are both sought after subtle diﬃculties arise (q ∈ (0, 1)).
Another important UC note is that the protocols above (and in fact all weak
bit-commitment protocols constructed previously for the receiver-strong case in
Moran and Noar’s work [18]) are not secure in stronger versions of the UC frame-
work, e.g., GUC (Generalised UC) or EUC (externalised UC) [7]. For a wrap-up
on GUC (Generalised UC) or EUC (externalised UC), see the full version of this
paper [3]. To support this claim, it is enough to show that the protocols are
not secure in the EUC framework. So, in an EUC model with the FDEOneSeal-setup
consider an environment that prepares the envelopes and feeds them to the ad-
versary. It is clear that the ideal adversary cannot “extract” the bit b to commit
to and thus he cannot indistinguishably simulate the commitment phase.
Lemma 4. In a hybrid EUC-model, where the setup is the FDEOneSeal functionality,
the CommitEnablesCheat protocol does not EUC-realizes the F 23−WBCLearnAtCommitment
functionality.
Due to space constraints, the proof of this lemma is given in the full version of
this paper [3].
As aforementioned, along very similar lines the receiver-strong protocols in
previous works [18] are not EUC-secure either. We modify the FDEOneSeal function-
ality slightly such that when used as a setup, we attain EUC-security of the
protocols herein and those WBC protocols in Moran and Noar’s work [18].
FpurpotedDEOneSeal : A Stronger Functionality for Tamper-Evident Distinguishable Sealed
Envelopes. This functionality stores tuples of the form (id, value, holder, state).
The values in one entry indexed with id, like before.
SealSend(id , value, Pj ). Let this command be received from an envelope-creator
party Pi. It seals an envelope and sends its id to the future holder Pj . If
this is the ﬁrst Seal message with id id, the functionality stores the tuple
(id, value, Pj , sealed) in the table. The functionality sends (id, Pi) to Pj and
to I. (Optionally, it can send (id, sealed) to Pi and to I). If this is not the ﬁrst
command of type Seal for envelope id, then the functionality halts.
Send(id , Pj ). Let this command be received from a holder-party Pi. This com-
mand encodes the sending of an envelope held by Pi to a party Pj . Upon re-
ceiving this command from party Pi, the functionality veriﬁes that there is an
entry in its table which is indexed by id and has holderid = Pi. If so, it out-
puts (Receipt, id, Pi, Pj) to Pj and I and replaces the entry in the table with
(id, valueid, Pj , stateid).
Open id . Let this command be received from a holder-party Pi. This command
encodes an envelop being opened by the party that currently holds it. Upon
receiving this command, the functionality veriﬁes that an entry for container id
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appears in the table and that holderid = Pi. If so, it sends (Opened, id, valueid)
to Pi and I and replaces the entry with (id, valueid, holderid, broken).
Verify id . Let this command be received from a holder-party Pi. This command
denotes Pi’s veriﬁcation of whether or not the seal on an envelope has been
broken. The functionality veriﬁes that an entry indexed by id appears in the
table and that holderid = Pi. It sends (Verified, id, stateid) to Pi and to I.
Themain diﬀerence betweenFpurpotedDEOneSeal and the originalFDEOneSeal functionality
is that an envelope is created for a speciﬁcally intended holder and this holder is
consequently notiﬁed with a message of the form (id, creator). Note that this en-
hancement is realistic (i.e., if to be used in a protocol, the delivery address of the
receiver is to be speciﬁed by a manufacturing body). However, note that the func-
tionality does not store or reveal publicly the creators of the envelopes (i.e., that
would be a stronger enhancement, akin to signing the tamper-evident devices).
With this modiﬁcation, the holder-to-be knows that a speciﬁc envelope has been
freshly produced by a speciﬁc creator. Intuitively, this prevents the weakness in
the proof of Lemma 4 from happening, i.e.,R cannot accept envelopes that are not
(newly) meant for him. Also, the creator is authenticated by the functionality, in
the sense that he cannot use envelopes made by others. In a larger sense, this can
prevent relay attacks. More formally, the following holds.
Theorem 5. In a hybrid EUC-model, where the setup is the FpurpotedDEOneSeal func-
tionality, the CommitEnablesCheat protocol EUC-realizes the F 23−WBCLearnAtCommitment
functionality.
The proof of the above theorem follows from the proofs of Theorem 2 and that
of Lemma 4, combined with the fact that FpurpotedDEOneSeal -envelopes have a speciﬁed
entity as their destination and this entity knows this fact upon the creation of
the envelopes. We conjecture that Theorem 5 holds even in the case of adaptive
adversaries.
4 Relations between (Weak) Bit-Commitments and
Distinguishable Envelopes in UC
Given the results above and those in [18], we have that FDEOneSeal (or FpurpotedDEOneSeal )
can create receiver-strong and sender-strong weak UC bit-commitments, which
in turn can be ampliﬁed to obtain regular UC bit-commitments. The FBC func-
tionality or a ﬂavour of it (see FCOM in [6]) constitutes a suﬃcient setup to
UC-realize a ZK protocol [6]. Under these circumstances, it is deﬁnitely inter-
esting to investigate the existent implications between diﬀerent sort of weak
bit-commitment, regular bit-commitment and tamper-evident envelopes, in the
UC framework.
Firstly, note that a multiple commitment FMCOM [6] setup suﬃces to UC-
realize an Fq−WBCEscapeThenMayCheat, Fq−WBCLearnAtCommitment or an Fq−WBCLearnAtOpening functionality,
for some q ∈ (0, 1). (We recall the FMCOM [6] functionality in the full version of
this paper [3]). In other words, several instances of the regular bit-commitment
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functionality FBC suﬃce to UC-construct a sender-strong weak bit-commitment.
In particular, three regular bit-commitment FBC functionalities (see the full ver-
sion of this paper [3]) UC-construct a 23 -WBC which is sender-strong. Let a pro-
tocol P be obtained from protocol CommitEnablesCheat where the creation and
transmission of the three envelopes is respectively replaced by creation and trans-
mission of three commitments using FMCOM or using three respective instances
of FBC . An analogous fact holds also for F 23−WBCLearnAtOpening, where to construct the
protocol P we use OpenEnablesCheat instead of CommitEnablesCheat.
Secondly, as a consequence of Theorem 3, note that all sender-strong weak
BCs UC-imply regular BCs.
Thirdly, it should be answered whether bit-commitment setup suﬃce to UC-
realize the FDEOneSeal distinguishable tamper-evident envelope functionality. We
conjecture that question 1 has a negative answer. This is intuitively due to the
fact that in bit-commitments it is the sender who opens the commitment and,
in an envelope-emulating protocol, it should be the envelope’s creator who needs
to perform the corresponding opening. But, in order for this to be generally
possible, an envelope creator ought to know the current envelope holder, which
is not the case in our formalisations (i.e., envelopes can be passed on from holder
to holder, without the notiﬁcation of the creator).
To sum up, ampliﬁcation proofs considered, we have completed the picture
of UC-realisability of diﬀerent ﬂavours of sender-strong weak BC with tamper-
evident envelopes and of their relation to (almost) regular BC and receiver-strong
weak BCs by Moran and Naor [18]. To some level, we can say that all weak BCs
are equivalent to regular BCs. We leave the EUC or the GUC correspondents of
the implications enumerated above as open questions.
5 Conclusions
Answering a variant of the open question in Moran and Naor’s work [18] and
several practical needs [9,14,11], we conclude that simple, sealed envelopes can
also create sender-strong (weak) bit-commitments protocols. In the process, we
have also discussed the fact that the protocols in [18] are not EUC-secure but only
UC-secure. We mainly focused on creating sender-strong bit-commitments with
the same level of security. Nevertheless, we showed how to modify the FDEOneSeal
functionality given in Moran and Naor’s work [18] such that we also create
(weak) bit-commitment protocols that are EUC-secure. We showed lightweight
ampliﬁcation proofs of our WBC protocols. We lastly discussed some of the
implications between UC weak BCs, UC regular BCs and distinguishable tamper-
evident UC envelopes. The interest in weak BC protocol per se was motivated
by both theoretical and practical reasons. The GUC-security of our schemes
remains to be discussed.
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